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Divided Government, Ideological Polarization, and Factional Coalitions: A Study of the House, 1947-2000

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Abstract

Divided Government, Ideological Polarization, and Factional Coalitions: A Study of the House, 1947-2000

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To understand the dynamics of legislative gridlock, as well as account for the mixed and often conflicting findings in the divided government literature, this paper posits that the previous unidimensional approach of using divided government as an explanatory variable of interest fails to accurately reflect the changing realities of American politics since WWII. Two new and interlocking conceptual approaches are introduced that expand the dimensionality of legislative gridlock: ideological polarization explained through the temporal shift of political parties from a system of moderation and universalistic policy outputs, to one where particularistic goals became much more common. As studies of divided government center on temporally-bound concepts, they ignore most of the inter- and intra-party variation evident throughout the 20th century.

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Studies of divided government traditionally focus on two broad theoretical concepts to explain legislative gridlock: organizational efficiency and electoral responsiveness. Based on rational expectations of ambitious politicians, political parties, it is believed, organize the diverse geographic interests of elected representatives into single governing units able to meet the needs of both member and voter. With the rise of legislative gridlock on one hand, and theoretical concerns of responsive governance on the other, scholars modeled their research on comparisons between unified and divided government. If history has shown that unified governments reconstitute the problems of society with vigor and purpose then analyzing government from this dichotomous approach should explain much of the variance of legislative gridlock. But in modeling their research on unidimensional explanations, the academic community created a conflicting body of work: one side arguing divided government causes gridlock the other side arguing to the contrary.

Critics of divided government argue a national government under control of two competing parties decreases the probability of enacting quality legislation. Because the parties lose the ability to effectively bridge the constitutional checks designed to temper impulsive legislation, they usually fail in addressing campaign promises, straining their relationship with voters. Divided government, they argue, tends to operate in mediocrity or end in failure. From Nixon's forced resignation to Clinton's political impeachment, presidents did not effectively organize a policy agenda backed with majority support responsive to the needs of voters. Opponents of this view, argue these findings diminish the legislative successes of divided government. Constitutional checks are a fact of political life any government must navigate; the terms of negotiating simply shift from a

partisan-centered agenda to a bipartisan one. Either way, both regime types must accommodate some members to reach a majority; the trick is in adjusting the particulars of a bill to ensure wide-ranging support. Moreover, it is not as if all governments during unified rule reach this conceptual goal of organizational efficiency and electoral responsiveness, never to experience gridlock. Carter, Clinton, Bush II, and now the Obama Administration are far from exemplary models of unified government practiced by FDR.

As scholars of divided government were forcing rigid concepts of governmental success onto a changing political environment; contemporary political research shifted much of its attention to the increased and expanded role of ideological polarization. Studies investigated the influence of ideological polarization on mass voting (Fiorina 2011, Gelman 2009), social and economic inequality (McCarty et al. 2006, Bartels 2010), elite-level politics (Rhode 1991, Brewer et al. 2002, Rae 1989, Theriault 2008), and its impact on legislative comity (Mann and Ornstein 2008, Sinclair 2006). Scholars of divided government, conversely, fail to account for the rise in ideological polarization as an additional dimension to explain legislative gridlock.

Studies of divided government have also fallen short in accounting for temporal variation in institutional politics. One assumption is parties operate similarly across time and space—a failure in one period can explain failure in all other periods. Yet parties are dynamic organizations that change depending on the size of ideological divergent members. Thus, where rational explanations of party might prove useful at one moment (Aldrich 1995), diverse and wide-ranging explanations of party prove useful at others (Ceaser 1978, Hofstadter 1969, Madison 2003 [1787]).

I argue that a multidimensional approach to researching legislative gridlock better explains the variation in the divided government literature. Introducing a typology that includes both regime type and level of polarization, this study advances the theory that a historical approach which accounts for the compression of four-party politics as well as the current polarized political environment more accurately reflects the governing realities parties navigate. The size of a factional coalition can change the ideological signature of a party, yet these coalitions do not last as the core group initiates mechanisms to push these members out of the party. The result is increased polarization and increased levels of legislative gridlock. What affect does this change in party and polarization have on government, specifically the constitutional order? While not specifically addressed in this study, the implications suggest high polarization based on ideology rather than classic definitions of party potentially distorts the constitutional separation of powers. If party is centered on ideological diverse interests without the tug of moderate influences can party potentially ignore the barriers between branches? Recent historical events suggest no. Finally, it should also be noted that this study does not preclude divided or unified government as strong indicators of gridlock. It only argues ideological polarization accentuates those differences depending on the size and influence of factional coalitions within the parties.

The Unified and Divided Government Debate

Throughout the 1990s, in what can be described as the golden age of divided government research, the political phenomenon of split party control of government inspired scholars to spill great amounts of ink researching both its causes and

consequences. During this time, two competing explanations on government productivity were advanced leaving behind a legacy that produced more questions than answers.

Some of divided government's earliest critics wrote on what seemed a reaction to the growing angst over government inaction. Sundquist (1988) argues that classic theories of political science advanced the theory that the function of political parties was to bind the branches of government together into a cohesive unit, creating a chain of authority that voters could easily relate. Divided government muddled this order of authority. No one knew who to assign blame as each party constantly criticized the other. If the president failed to get his budget passed, for example, he could blame a noncompliant Congress. In return, Congress could counter the president did not provide leadership. Sundquist argues that when the branches of government are under the control of two different parties an opposition-led Congress should oppose the president since any admission of accepting his program is an outright admission of the president as their leader—a member of the opposite party! It would be bad politics to follow the leader of the opposition party. Each party, then, hides behind a surreptitious veil of ignorance while actively engaging in partisan politics.

Other scholars echoed these concerns by studying the impact of divided government on specific subjects. One argument advanced the theory (Pfiffner 1991) that a president cannot always succeed in reaching his policy goals. Two main reasons: an assertive Congress and the constitutional check of the separation of powers. While every president, regardless if government is unified or not, has to potentially deal with these checks, these limitations are amplified when government is divided. Another study has argued that divided government forces a president to use his constitutional prerogative of

the veto not only to oppose legislation he deems unfit for law, but also as a strategic method of protecting his party's political position from the opposition (Kernell 1991). Divided government is also blamed on the growing deficits of the 1980s. McCubbins (1991a, 1991b) argues that the increased spending of the time was not the result of Congress abdicating its authority or the political influence of Reagan, but is instead attributable to both parties mutually agreeing to increase spending across all functions of government rather than one side risking a loss in funding to a core-constituent program. Early findings on the consequences of divided government, then, tended to support the hypothesis that unified government was simply a better governing arrangement.

The notion that divided government stressed the political system was turned on its head when Mayhew (1991) presented findings that little difference existed in the quantity and quality of legislation enacted between unified and split control of government. Using both journalistic and expert opinion, Mayhew's approach would forever alter the debate on divided government. Others would join Mayhew in what Colman (1999) termed the revisionist approach to split party control of government. The trends in these studies posit that there are alternative explanations to government inaction and that the critics of divided government tend to overemphasize the structural limitations of split-party control. From explanations that government action is stalled because the political parties can no longer control their political message nor control who runs for office (Malbin 1994) to the theory that the causes of gridlock actually fluctuates between divided government, electoral-induced localism, congressional decentralization, and presidential leadership failure (Rieselbach 1996), and from historical explanations that modern politics is not divided but fragmented due to the loose party affiliations of voters (Silbey

1996). Others argues along more traditional lines that all governments, regardless of they are unified or divided, have to meet supermajority hurdles (Krehbiel 1998, Brady and Volden 2006), limit debate on ideological issues (Quirk and Nesmith 2006), and account for the bicameral complexities of Congress (Binder 2003). These and other accounts actually highlight the dynamic nature of American politics.

Not content with these alternative explanations, scholars doubled their efforts to test both Mayhew's theory as well as expand our understanding of the limits of divided government. One study (Edwards et al. 1997) introduced the viewpoint of the president and his support of important legislation. The authors found that the president is more likely to oppose important legislation when government is divided than when it is unified. Similar findings have been presented for agenda setting (Edwards and Barrett 2000). In this study the authors find that the president has less of an advantage in setting the agenda when government is divided. In one of the more comprehensive studies to classify the differences between major and landmark legislation Howell et al. (2000) find that landmark legislation is less likely to pass when government is divided while the difference is less pronounced with major legislation. Other studies that have contributed to the debate include findings that coalition formation is difficult during periods of divided government (Thorsen 1997), party responsiveness is weaker when government is divided (Colman 1999), and the negativity between the political parties is easier to convey when government is divided (Groeling and Kernell 2000).

Tally of the Findings

While both sides in the debate present compelling and well argued evidence, the mixed record poses questions concerning the literature's conceptual and methodological approaches. For one, since both sides of the ledger observe the same political history, the same political actors, and in some cases use the same indicators, this paper argues this mixed record is attributable to the literature's longstanding practice of modeling divided government as the main indicator of interest. Increasing explanatory power relies on a reconceptualization of what causes legislative gridlock. Second, this approach overlooks the changing political environment from a system were moderate coalitions within parties forced ideological diversity on the entire political process to a system where inter-party conflict, or between party conflict, seemed to handcuff all levels of government. The deterministic nature of the divided government literature is one that ignores the multidimensionality of an evolving political system.

The purpose of this paper, then, is to shift the debate away from the causal indicators created by Mayhew and his critics to one that incorporates a holistic approach to understanding legislative gridlock. In fact, both sides of the debate are correct in one respect—their explanation accurately depicts one snapshot of a larger political picture. Divided government does cause legislative gridlock as many contend, but this conclusion only reflects the conflict of a polarized political system. Ignoring temporal variability resulted in inconsistencies in the literature. Pierson (2004) advances the argument that using one theory to explain a long temporal view of American politics limits the explanatory power of that theory. One must apply a mix of theories and methods that includes a historical perspective to their approach as no one theory or paradigm can comprehensively and accurately describe the dynamics of politics.

American political history between WWII and the 21st century is such a case in point. Where divided government during the Clinton Administration was filled with examples of intense political conflict—a narrative that at the outset seems to support the critical view of divided government—the scorecard for Truman's Administration is far different. While the two parties did have substantial differences, the political atmosphere of the moment forced Truman to approach political confrontation differently than Clinton would forty year later. Since Clinton's core partisans in Congress were highly cohesive and most moderates were purged from the party, he benefited form using an obstructionist posture since the opposition could not convince enough Democrats to join with then. Truman, on the other hand, was forced to accept most of the Republican Party's policy positions since many of the southern conservative Democrats aligned with the Republican majority (Conley 2000). Still, the accomplishments during Truman's two years of divided government[1] are fairly impressive which raises questions to some of the findings the divided government literature used in classifying the Truman and Clinton years under the same rubric.

The Role of Party, the Growth of Ideological Polarization, and A Theory of Gridlock

A theory of legislative gridlock and divided government presented here is centered on the changing role of party and the growth of ideological polarization. This theory argues that gridlock, though traditionally attributable to divided government, is better explained through the lens of ideological polarization. Figure 1 presents a parsimonious typology of conditions under which legislative productivity operates,

[1] Taft-Hartley, the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, stabilization of farm prices, a federal clean water

especially across large blocks of political history. The two determining factors for legislative productivity are the type of government the system operates under, unified or divided, and the level of ideological diversity, moderate or polarized. The assumption of this theory, regardless of the operational conditions of government, is the level of ideological diversity—the size of a moderate block of members who on one or more issues vote against the core of their party—dictates the level of gridlock in the system. As the figure shows, regardless if government is unified or divided, the level of productivity is, under a system of moderate political conflict, theoretically, quite high. The divided government and moderate cell is labeled mixed-productive since partisan forces can and do have an effect on the success of a bill becoming law.

Figure 1: Typology of Conditions for Government Productivity

		Ideological Diversity	
		Moderate	Polarized
Government Type	Divided	Mixed-Productive	Gridlock
	Unified	Productive	Gridlock/Coalition Dependent

A political system under high levels of ideological polarization, on the other hand, confirms much of the divided government literature regarding the productivity of split party control and gridlock. Yet this theory also suggests the literature is incorrect in overemphasizing the ability of a unified regime in both sidestepping the constitutional hurdles and in organizing an effective and responsive front under conditions of high polarization. This theory argues that the only strategy a unified majority can use in

act, and the Berlin airlift, to name but a few.

maintaining the link of responsiveness between party and voter during a polarized period is to ensure they have the coalitional support of the entire party. Success for a unified regime, then, is not dependent on the power of discourse or the ability of the party to effectively navigate veto points. Instead, success for a unified regime during periods of high polarization is entirely dependent on the size of their majority. Because the probability of enticing ideological divergent members to cross party lines and support a policy most within the party oppose is quite low, and because most unified governments since the Carter administration have been marginally tight,[2] political success for a unified government is entirely majority size dependent.

This theory of legislative gridlock is also temporally flexible where contemporary theories of party and divided government is not. A general consensus in the divided government literature is parties operate as groups of rational actors and the expectations that govern behavior at one period are similar across all periods; the preferences that dominate the agenda at time t bear on the preferences at time $t + n$. This theoretical assumption is centered on the notion that parties are incapable of change as the structure of partisan control forces each side into a predetermined playbook. Thus, according to the divided government theorists, split party control operates in either the divided/polarized quadrant or, for those who argue the difference between both regimes is slight, shares similar successes with unified government in the unified/moderate quadrant. Obviously, such arguments fail to account for the level of ideological polarization and number of moderate partisans in the process. From the argument that divided government, by its

[2] Excluding the Obama Administration since this electoral victory created near supermajority status in the House.

very nature, yields higher levels of legislative gridlock to arguments that constitutional checks and exogenous forces dictate the existence of gridlock, both camps fail to consider the changing structure of party in both its operation and diversity of membership.

Articulated by Aldrich (1995), a theory of rational party politics argues ambitious politicians seek to maximize their electoral chances through the mechanism of party: incumbents use party to secure reelection by providing benefits to those who elected them. The theoretical thrust of the argument centers on a quid pro quo between elected representative and voter. For the purposes of this project, it is important to note a conflict exists between this understanding of party and unified and divided government. On the one hand, this understanding of party is centered on enforced party discipline (Cox and McCubbins 1993) and voting blocks of cohesive likeminded members (Rhode 1991, Aldrich and Rhode 2000). Any notion of collective responsibility to voters outside of a geographic region is not considered in the equation—such actions, if they occur, are irrational. Where critics of divided government argue the inherent problem of split party control of power is the unbending will of preferences, or simply the rigid preferences of party create conditions where gridlock occurs more frequently, proponents contend cohesive and disciplined parties actually add in overcoming constitutional hurdles if legislation accommodates both parties. In sum, both sides suggest disciplined and cohesive parties exist.[3] The debate is over the impact of legislative output during unified and divided government.

[3] Most of the literature describes party politics as one side opposing the other or one party aiding the other. Rarely does the narrative describe defection of members of one party aiding the opposition.

This theory of party also, accentuates, and by its very nature supports, a polarized party system where groups of likeminded members are expected to take control of government then use power to return benefits to those who elected them. A founding understanding of party, on the other hand, reluctantly accepts political parties as vehicles of competition and questions whether this view of party, theoretical or actual, is beneficial to universal policy outputs. There seems, then, to be confusion between terms such as party, ideology, and polarization. Party in the Madison sense is a collective compromise between different groups in order to limit one group of faction from surreptitiously controlling power. It was important to introduce many wide-ranging interests into the political process in order to halt one particular interest or faction from obtaining the levers of government (Gillespie 1993). Rational perspectives of party seem to ignore this understanding and push a definition of party that is quite opposite to a traditional meaning of party, yet argue that party is the impetus for all government action. Thus, government inaction is party-centered rather than ideology or faction as Madison describes it.

Modern theorists of American government, and divided government scholars in particular, tend to overlook this distinction, arguing that fault lies in the system of government rather than with those that operate within it. If early predecessors of government ignored or were unaware of the concepts of party organization and electoral responsiveness contemporary scholars believe are the tenets of an effective working government, it was because they placed the onus of enacting important law into the hands of those elected to debate the issues of the moment. Blame for failing to enact a particular

law was not placed on the structure of the system. Instead, failure signified that a particular outcome lacked standing with a broad consensus of the moment[4].

The second conflict in the party literature is transaction costs. Parties, by nature of their cohesive structure, the argument continues, reduce the political price of doing business in government—navigating constitutional hurdles, unifying behind a common message, and so forth. Where the divided government literature tends to disagree over the distribution of these costs—critics contend the cost is an inherent part of divided government, opponents of this view contend the cost is held within the constitutional checks of government—there seems to be little disagreement in the fact that cohesive parties, in one way or another, can transcend these costs. But this view of party overlooks the level of polarization that parties, historically, negotiate. Further, negotiating to reduce transaction costs, contrary to arguments of rational choice theorists, is not necessarily lower within than between parties. At certain times, such assumptions can be made. But as the variability of history has shown, parties, more often than contemporary theories of politics are willing to acknowledge, must negotiate within and between parties.

The broad history of party and divided government is a cyclical pattern replete with intra-party factions and varying levels of party polarization. Such a notion is relatively absent in both the party and divided government literature. Figure 2 presents a time series of party polarization in the House of Representatives from the first to the 110th Congress. One defining feature of the series is that besides the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the only other period in American history where polarization reached its

[4] As a side note, there are some modern studies of institutional politics producing work suggesting parties operate outside of the traditional mold of party (Wood 2009, Bensel 1987).

highest point is during the contemporary political period. Furthermore, besides a precipitous dip during the Era of Good Feelings, 1816 to 1824, the post-New Deal era records the lowest levels of ideological polarization across the history of American politics. While the causes of polarization are different between both periods, its one defining feature is a contraction of ideological moderation of intra-party factional groups.



Polarization from the post-Reconstruction period illustrates the dynamic nature of parties and divided government. The first period of high polarization, from the late 1880s to 1932, exemplified the conflict of localized and regional interests. Even with a potential party-splitting issue as monetary policy, the Democratic Party, by 1896, united behind a policy of silver-backed currency, minimizing the potential for factions to break from the party. Party organization was strong and unbending. Wilson (1885) described these parties as parochial-based machines intent on maintaining their local hold on power. This practice failed to bridge the constitutional gaps in solving society's ills—presidents were

weak and both Congress and the machines took advantage. Not only did the parties of the time control all aspects of government, worse, Wilson argued, political parties fractured the separation of powers because they failed to provide the president with national authority perpetuating local power at the expense of national interest. Silbey (1991) argued that not only were parties organizationally strong, they also articulated important issues of the moment, tightening the association with voters since party echoed their concerns. Politics was polarized because both parties held a strong grip on all aspects of its operation from the nominating process, to a unified message, and removing factional members from their ranks.

Another feature of this period is the high frequency of divided government. Between the elections of 1868 and 1896, government was divided 9 of 14 times—a number comparable to our own period of divided government. Silbey (1996) argues that this early period of divided government, as opposed to the heightened period of divided government one hundred years later, reflects a system of strong political parties vying for control of government. To Silbey, instances of divided government are time bound. Galloway (1961) substantiates this argument in his historical narrative of extreme party conflict and the adoption of Reed's Rules into the standard practices of the House. Because the level of partisan differences stalled the chamber in gridlock, the Republican leader effectively removed the parliamentary tactic of the disappearing quorum. Fast forward 60 years to the Eisenhower Administration and Congress is dominated by the seniority system and factional coalitions that formed in direct response to the strict procedural rules needed in a polarized system. In a system where party organization is weak and individual interests influence the types of policy, as well as the degree of

restrictiveness on procedural freedoms, conflict is dispersed since party, at the request of membership, loosens the mechanisms that control factional coalitions (Schickler 2001). Partisan conflict, as this paper argues, is articulated in a theory of ideological polarization rooted in the strength of parties.

One of the more interesting eras in institutional politics, roughly from 1933 to Watergate, is highlighted by the lowest party polarization in history. Schattshneider (1942), would describe this period as one relatively bereft of conflict, an era of natural bipartisanship. Others would write that parties were diverse coalitions and appealed to voters on similar issues (Key 1964, Sorauf 1964, Eldersveld 1964). Coalitional dynamics of the time was a mix of intra-party disagreements between southern conservative Democrats, liberal northern Republicans, and their respective party leadership. Milkis (1993) argues these coalitions formed because FDR actively sought to weaken the traditional role of parties so as to expand his policy agenda. Consequently, to achieve these policy goals the president needed strong support in Congress and promptly turned his back on the southern system of institutionalized racism. In the end, this appeasement to secure majority status to aid in policy change would lead to future coalitional battles between liberals and conservatives of the Democratic Party that would pave the road to polarized politics.

Divided government during this period of low polarization was markedly different than divided government of the 1990s. For one, the large coalitions of southern Democrats and northern Republicans forced presidents and party leadership to legislate from moderate policy positions. Policy was written with a middle-out strategy to accommodate party defectors or entice members of the opposition and was rarely written

from extreme ideological positions—a strategy the next polarized generation would fail to grasp. Writing in a time when political science used forgotten theories of iron triangles and pluralism, Lowi (1979) sized up the era as one where party meant little and satisfying as many interests as possible meant everything. In sum, cartel theories and conditional theories of party played much less of a role in the governing structure of this period. Mayhew (1991) and scholars of pivotal politics (Krehbiel 1998, Brady and Volden 2006) accurately discern that, at times, party politics means less than critics of divided government, knowingly or not, admit. But where this theoretical approach to divided government comes up short, a theory of fluctuating levels of ideological polarization enhances our understanding of government productivity since partisan control of government is dependent on the freedom of factional partisans. As the gridlock typology suggests, moderate polarization and divided government does not preclude the possibility of legislative success.

The contemporary period of high ideological polarization is profoundly different than the previous period. Bond and Fleisher (1990) argue that the relationship between Congress and the president is centered on an interaction between party affiliation and ideology. As we have seen, this interaction can change influencing the scope and reach of policy outputs. Improving on Burns' (1963) theory that institutional politics is based on four not two parties, Bond and Fleisher further that this categorization is better explained in the relationship of conservatives and liberals with their respective party. But later work by Bond and Fleisher (2000), argues that this view of institutional politics is no longer valid, as moderate members of each party were no longer welcome into the 'new' party system. Beginning in the late 1980s, after liberal Democrats and conservative

Republicans purged many of the moderates from their ranks (Rae 1989, Rhode 1991, Rae 1994), and elected officials realigned and became a reflection of the representative voters were seeking (Black and Black 1992, 2002), a partisan environment formed that lacked moderate compromise.

With the steady purge of moderate members from the parties, finding enough support for large legislative agendas became much more difficult. As policy was increasingly written from extreme positions and tight majority margins and unreachable supermajority veto-proof positions meant a governing environment prone to gridlock, all government, unified or divided, was prone to polarized gridlock. Johnson and Broder (1996), for example, blame the failure of Congress to pass healthcare reform in 1994 on the Clinton Administration violating this moderation approach. Rather than listen to the prescient political advice of Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee Dan Rostenkowski, who suggested a moderate bill to ensure passage, the Administration chose instead to listen to more extreme members of the party. With a shrinking ideological median, this example would become a typical political scene in an increasingly polarized environment. Divided government, too, as many of Mayhew's critics would contend, did increase the level of legislative gridlock that pundits and political commentators would lament in print and television. Clearly the typology accounts for limits in the divided government literature as well as instances of gridlock under unified government.

In sum, a theory of unified and divided government is rooted in a historical view of party. Partisan conflict is a complex amalgam of inter- and intra-party heterogeneity that fluctuates depending on the size and intensity of intra-party factional coalitions.

When a party is unified behind a strong coalition of likeminded members the natural predisposition for conflict that is inherent in politicians shifts attention to the opposition party. On the other hand, when a party has a large coalition of members that lack the same partisan unity as the leadership, attention is shifted inwards. This view of inter-governmental conflict, factional politics, and ideological polarization, it should be noted, does not dismiss the rational choice explanation of party and its subsequent use in the divided government literature. Nor does this theory imply that the literature ignores legislative failures during unified government. Instead, it argues that these theories do in fact explain institutional behavior but only at certain periods and under certain conditions. This theory contributes to the debate by adding the explanatory indicator of ideological polarization into the calculus of legislative gridlock. The history of American institutional politics is far too dynamic to leave to one theory and one concept of party behavior.

Data and Methods

To capture the influence of polarization on legislative productivity an individual-level measure is used. The traditional approach to measuring the productivity of unified and divided government uses aggregate-level measures that count the number of bills passed during each Congress. I attempt a different approach and use individual-level measures of ideology and polarization to determine how these individual characteristics contribute to the overall level of gridlock in government. I proceed by describing a different measure of dependent variable used in this study followed by a description of

the explanatory variables and finally the empirical tests used. Appendix A provides a description of how certain measures are calculated.

The dependent variables are individual measures of legislative gridlock. Because this study argues that ideological polarization influences gridlock and those influences are captured through the moderate tug of factional coalitions, using counts of important laws passed seems inadequate to capture the ideological polarization in a given chamber at a given time. Further, since the number of laws passed varies from Congress to Congress, it is difficult to compare uneven counts across time. Individual-level gridlock scores have the benefit of measuring how much gridlock each member contributes to the overall level of gridlock in the system. For this measure I use individual recorded votes on various roll calls in the House of Representatives between the 80th and 106th Congress. I currently use three[5] different dependent variables: Mayhew's extended dataset of important legislation,[6] and final passage and conference reports the president is recorded taking an aye[7] or nay position.[8] I use Mayhew's (1991) laws and presidential positions influenced by Edwards et al. (1997) as my dependent variable for two reasons. First, Mayhew's study is the most influential study in the divided government literature and is the impetus for pushing research on the subject forward. I include presidential positions

[5] Due to space considerations I have also calculated procedural votes on which the president has taken a position. Procedural votes comprise amendments, recommitals, and other motions. The ayes for his data set comprises 630 roll calls; the smallest number of roll calls occurring during the 91st and 105th House (12 roll calls each) and the largest during the 99th House (51 roll calls). The nays of this data set comprises 1146 roll calls; the smallest number of roll calls occurring during the 80th and 82nd House (2 roll calls) and the largest during the 96th House (122 roll calls).

[6] This data set comprises 387 roll calls; the smallest number of roll calls occurring during the 86th House (5 roll calls) and the largest during the 93rd House (30 roll calls).

[7] This data set comprises 1311 roll calls; the smallest number of roll calls occurring during the 80th House (8 roll calls) and the largest during the 90th House (129 roll calls).

since any study of divided government is rooted in a systemic study of government. At its core, scholars study divided government to understand the relationship between the executive and members of Congress. As such, a position on which the president publicly takes a stand warrants attention. I exclude roll calls on important legislation since the laws used seem fairly subjective. All roll call votes and positions are taken from The *Policy Agendas Project*, the *ICPSR* database, and the online *CQ Almanac*. Finally, the gridlock measure is calculated as the proportion of times the member voted in opposition to a specific roll call.[9]

I divide the explanatory variables for this study into three different categories: a base polarization model, a coalition or regional model, and an institutional model. Ideological dynamics of the House are measured using DW-NOMINATE scores (Poole and Rosenthal 2007). The main variables of interest are member polarization and ideological distance between members and the president. Ideological distance from the president is simply the first dimension ideological distance of a member from the president; this measure is a proxy[10] for the first dimension measure and, from a systemic view, is easier to interpret. Further, since this study is concerned with the systemic influence of ideology, rather than describe the relative conservative or liberal measure of members, it is theoretically appealing to describe the level of ideological divergence of congressional members toward a given president.

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[8] The data set comprises 829 roll calls; the smallest number of roll calls occurring during the 81st, 82nd, and 88th House (1 roll call each) and the largest during the 100th House (90 roll calls).

[9] For example, if a president is recorded as taking a nay position on a vote to recommit a bill back to committee and a member votes aye on that vote, then that member is considered gridlocked for that vote.

[10] The coefficients are the same whether one uses first dimension scores or my member distance from the president. This is because the ideological value of each member is subtracted from a single value of the president.

The regional explanatory variables differentiate between homogenous members of a party and those members who lack sufficient party unity. Building on theories presented by Burns (1963), Rae (1989), and Bond and Fleisher (1990), I separate members by their party unity scores into six different categories. For the Democrat Party, I separate members into a southern faction, a unified core, and all other members who lack unity but are not from the south. I follow Key's (1948) eleven state classification of southern states. For the Republican Party, I separate members into a northern[11] faction, a unified core, and all other members who lack unity but are not from the northern states. I use these classifications since, historically, the dominate factions within both parties have been liberal northern Republicans (Rae 1989) and southern conservative Democrats (Key 1948, Black and Black 1987). One feature of this study, and a slight divergence from traditional studies on southern politics, is that I do not classify all southern members under the southern rubric, for example. This is because I calculate a southern conservative or liberal northerner differently: all defectors are labeled as those with a party unity score that is one standard deviation below the party median. Theoretically, party unity scores are a better indicator of party cohesion since they capture how often members vote with fifty percent of their party in direct opposition against fifty percent of the other party. In other words, this measure removes members from the core party who should not be considered strong partisans and creates a factional coalition based on actual partisan support. I use party unity scores from Poole's DW-NOMINATE database. The coding classification for each coalition is a dummy variable were "1" is the respective

[11] Northern states are classified as Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.

coalition with all others coded as "0." I leave the core Republican Party as the base category.

One potential criticism of this study is there is no way of determining if government is unified or divided. I compensate for this by creating a dummy variable for members of the president's party where "1" signifies a representative is a member of the president's party compared to all others. While this coding schema does not distinguish between a government that is unified and divided, it does signify members of the president's party and how this classification influences a gridlock score. It should be noted, though, that the theoretical thrust of this study is that divided government must be a poor measure since the literature has produced such a mixed set of findings. Furthermore, because this is an individual-level study that centers on the moderate influence of divergent coalitional members, including divided government as a measure is, theoretically, beside the point. To further allay any possible criticisms I created an institutional feature[12] measure comprised of dummy measures that account for first dimension ideology by grouping members into majority and supermajority categories. I accomplish this by sorting all members by their first dimension score and code all members who fall within the ≤ 218 range—the simple majority block—and the ≥ 219 and ≤ 291 range—the supermajority block. Each member is coded a "1" for their respective standing. The base category is all members above the 292 range. Another point to consider with this measure is that it should differentiate between majority support for legislation, or the president's legislation, but also capture the dynamics of ideological

positioning the further one moves from the president's core voting block. Thus, comparable to the conditional party government thesis (Rhode 1991, Aldrich and Rhode 2000), the more unified, in this case ideologically, a party and the stronger the parties numerical majority, the less gridlocked the chamber will be when government is unified.

The statistical tests I use for this study are ordinary least squares (OLS). I estimate 27 different OLS regressions for each of the three models and each of the three dependent variables for a total of 243 regressions. Because the distributions for each dependent variable were questionable in regards to normality, I tested for heteroscedasticity and corrected each model as required. Future iterations of this model will have to be tested for the proper distributions and the appropriate regressions will have to be included.

Findings

Polarization and Gridlock

Figure 3 presents the mean gridlock scores for Mayhew's laws, presidential ayes, and presidential nays. An interesting feature of the graph is the level of gridlock, from the 80th to 106th House, regardless if government is unified or divided, is relatively stable across time. Furthermore, both Mayhew's laws and presidential ayes are relatively low, or high if one views this graph from a unified government perspective, and fairly consistent: the long-term average for both measures being .219 and .231. One possible inference of this finding is certain laws transcend politics. That is, regardless of ideological polarization, the type of regime, and even the party that controls government,

[12] This coding classification should be taken with caution as members obviously fluctuate in their positions given the issues. So, there is no true way of knowing where a member stood on a certain bill nor there is no

laws get passed, or members simply vote yes on these bills. Another possibility is these laws are the bills everyone, in some form or capacity, have negotiated for and are willing to live with. In that case, one could argue Mayhew cherry-picked his research for bills that would have made any study of government look bipartisan.



At its core, politics, for better or worse, is a narrative of conflict and one has to look within the data to unearth where the conflict resides. Figure 2 shows presidential nays, bills the president took a position against, have a much higher gridlock score: average .684. On these bills, more than half of the House tends to vote against the president suggesting there is a political dynamic within institutional politics of severe conflict when a majority of the House and the president cannot agree on a bill. This finding also suggests that there is a constant level of conflict on nay positions as well as Mayhew's laws and aye positions.

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way of knowing if a member was the pivotal 218th or 291st member.

Table 1 (presented in Appendix B) presents OLS results for the base polarization model from the 80th to the 106th House. All of the models hold up well and most coefficients reach traditional levels of statistical significance. Three important findings for the Mayhew data are worth noting. First, the findings show that a member's ideological distance from the president has the strongest effect on the level of gridlock, supporting the main theoretical hypothesis of the paper. As expected, the relative successes of the Eisenhower and Nixon divided governments are attributed to lower levels of member polarization and smaller ideological distances between members and the president. There are of course some exceptions with the 85th and 94th House. Furthermore, during Houses where the ideological distance between members and the president is higher, the effect of member polarization is lower. Also, it is not until the Reagan era that the influence on member polarization reaches some of its highest levels.

A second point to note is even though the constant for each model follows the traditional understanding of divided government—that is, unified governments enjoy either a smaller level of gridlock as a base or in most cases have negative gridlock scores indicating, *ceteris paribus,* unified governments have an easier starting point—the size of the coefficient for the distance between members and the president is highest across all unified governments. This finding suggests ideologically divergent members during unified government resist the majority's policies. On the other hand, during divided government the effect of this coefficient is much lower suggesting some form of compromise is reached that the majority of the opposition party votes on a bill the president signs. Interestingly, this trend is altered during the divided government years of the Clinton Administration. Here, the affect of ideologically divergent members is in the

negative direction suggesting strong compromise between the Gingrich Republicans and the Democrat president. Thus, even though the budget battles and political impeachment of the president are listed under the infamous heading of 'reasons divided government is bad,' the fact remains both parties agreed to such legislation as the American Investors Protection Act, Commodity Futures Modernization Act, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, and the Taxpayer Bill of Rights, to name a few. Whether this legislative success is attributable to bipartisan compromise or Clinton's ability to adapt to the political environment, these findings support the study's hypothesis that lower levels of ideological polarization ease the way for legislative success.

The final point to note is the influence of the president's party on overall levels of gridlock. Interestingly, for members of the president's party, the coefficient tends in the negative direction during divided governments. While the expectation, according to the divided government literature, is members of the president's party will support his positions—a core argument of the literature that places the root of all conflict in party position—the evidence suggests a majority party under unified government struggles with factional members within their party. In some cases the evidence shows that the affect of a positive gridlock coefficient negates the beneficial position most unified governments start under. The only divided governments where this is not the case is Truman and the 80th and the six years of divided government under Clinton. In these instances, when the president needed his partisans most, they tended to abandon him. This phenomenon also suggests an inherent problem within the Democrat Party which I will address in the next section.

For the presidential aye dependent variable, many of the findings are quite similar to those found under Mayhew's laws so the same general inferences are drawn as above. The interesting dependent variable is positions on which the president took a nay stance. Here, every constant is positive regardless of government type indicating an area of politics that is highly conflictual. Ignoring results from the 80th to 88th House,[13] the affect of ideological distance between member and president is highest when government is unified, suggesting when the president is in opposition to a certain bill a coalition forms around a bill that the normal core partisans generally would not support. During divided governments, the evidence suggests most members support a president's opposition to a bill they disapprove. A more probable explanation is members of the House are ideologically closer to Republican presidents and as such are less inclined to oppose, for example, Reagan over a bill he opposes than Carter. The negative coefficients for member polarization are mostly likely picking up both polarized parties in support of their respective presidents. As expected, there is a difference in the magnitude between president's party and ideology supporting this paper's claim that the distinction of party probably means less than the pull of ideology.

Coalitional Politics and Gridlock

Figures 4 and 5 present descriptive summaries of polarization scores for the main coalitions in institutional party politics. This paper has argued that unified or divided government is not the main cause of gridlock. Instead, one must look to the amount of ideological polarization within the political system. Further, this paper has argued that

[13] The number of roll calls for these first few Congresses is too low to confidently infer conclusions. It

polarization increases as the size of moderate coalitions diminishes. In both graphs, the levels of ideological polarization have been fairly constant across time. As the core partisans of each party remained constant at the 0.30 level (for ease of interpretation we can say that the main branch of the parties were roughly 30 percent polarized) while the factional coalitions were generally half as polarized. It was not until after the parties began purging moderate members from their ranks that the level of polarization for each group increased dramatically. Currently, this study does not control for the size of each coalition, meaning the ideological weight of the measure is assumed constant across time.[14]

Figure 4: Democrat Party Polarization by Coalition, 1947-2000



seems presidents during this time took very few negative positions on final passage votes.

[14] This is a point that will have to be corrected in further editions of this project. For example, during the 89th House the size of the southern coalition was 65 members strong while during the 106th House it had diminished to 19.



Table 2 (presented in Appendix B) presents regression results that control for factional coalitions. As expected, controlling for individual member polarization, as well as ideological distance from the president, accounts for much of the gridlock in the system. Turning to the southern conservative coalition, a fluctuation is evident that at first glance seems counterintuitive. During the Eisenhower and Nixon presidencies, southern conservatives were more likely to vote against Mayhew laws and positions the president supported than their unified northern partisans. The opposite was the case for the Kennedy and Johnson years. One inference to draw from this finding is that all presidents during this period, in some form or another, signed legislation antithetical to southern preferences. Since Democrats controlled the legislative agenda they pushed through bills the main coalition of southerners opposed. In order to compensate for this loss in majority strength, northern liberal Republicans crossed the aisle and supported liberal Democrats and the president. The evidence is presented in the northern Republican

column. For the unified Democrat and liberal Republican rubric, every coefficient that reaches statistical significance trends in unison. Though the magnitude is less for liberal Republicans, there is no mistake that support for Mayhew's laws and positions the president supported (bills undoubtedly important and in some cases targeted toward minorities) was achieved or enhanced by bipartisan support. Thus, even though liberal Democrats and Republicans were gridlocked toward Republican presidents, they were far less gridlocked than southern conservatives. As the hypotheses of this paper argue, moderate ideological diversity, regardless of government type, can create bipartisanship.

Institutional Features and Gridlock

Most alternative explanations of legislative gridlock focus on constitutional limitations such as majority and supermajority support. In an attempt to capture the influence of majority size at the individual level, I test a ranking system that lines all members by ideological intensity. Similar to schoolchildren forming a line by height, I create a similar line but one divided by ideology where both ends of the line have the "tallest" members. Figures 5 through 8 compare the progression of members from the beginning of the time series and the end. For purposes of space, I compare the 81st and 103rd Democratic unified governments and the 80th and 106th divided governments with Democratic presidents and Republican controlled House. The obvious finding from these graphs is the ideological diversity at the 218 majority point. For the 81st House, this position was extremely moderate. Compared to the 103rd House we see an ideology score 90 times more liberal than a member who would have occupied this theoretical position 44 years earlier. The divided government graphs reveal a different trend. While the

ideological position of the 218th member is relatively the same (.151 versus .182), the real point of interest is the supermajority position. Where the position in 1947-48 was held by a moderate Democrat with an ideology score of 0.005 (Olin E. Teague, TX), the same position in the 106th House was held by a Democrat with an ideology score of -0.309 (Ron Klink, PA). This suggests, and supports the argument, that the dynamics of negotiating is much different in a polarized environment than in one with moderate members or factions.

Figure 6: 81st Democratic House During Democratic Unified Government, 1949-1950



Figure 7: 103rd Democratic House During Unified Government, 1993-1994



Figure 8: 80th Republican House During Divided Government, 1947-1948





Table 3 presents regression results for the institutional model controlling for majority position, supermajority position, member polarization, and ideological distance from president. The expectation for this model is during periods of high polarization, the ideological measures should have a larger affect on gridlock than institutional features. Similar to the previous models, ideological distance from the president has the strongest magnitude. Another finding is only two different Houses, the 87th and 96th, have a negative gridlock score. Thus, institutional features create a governing environment that creates gridlock—a conclusion we would expect. On the other hand, the measures for majority and supermajority positions do not hold up as well across time as the polarization coefficients. At some points, the values comport with what we would expect to find—during the unified 103rd House the majority coefficient is negative, -0.2254, and the supermajority coefficient has a smaller magnitude, -0.1103. This suggests that as the president's coalition decreases, or as the votes that are need for passage require votes outside of the core gridlock increases. At other points, the values are similar regardless if the coefficient is majority or supermajority. One finding of this model that supports the

paper's hypotheses is the effect of institutional features, as measured in this paper, loses statistical significance in the contemporary period. As the table shows, the magnitude of polarization and ideological distance from the president increases except for the Clinton divided government for Mayhew's laws and positions Clinton supported. On positions Clinton opposed, majority size was statistical insignificant while ideological distance from the president had an extremely large effect on gridlock.

Conclusion

Research on divided government has vastly expanded our knowledge of inter-government relations between Congress and the president. But the mixed findings in the literature leave behind questions of both the theoretical and methodological approaches of these studies. This study has approached the topic of divided government from a different theoretical perspective and has attempted to measure this theory from an individual rather than aggregate level as most previous works attempt. The main theoretical objection against the divided government literature has been the relative void of including ideological polarization as an explanatory variable. Where most political science research approach topics in contemporary politics through the lens of polarization; divided government scholars do not. A consequence of studying institutional politics from the vantage point of unified versus divided government is a potential loss of accurate explanatory power that comports with political realities.

The findings of this study tend to support its main hypotheses. First, ideological polarization, as measured by individual-level polarization and ideological distance from the president, shows the strongest effect on gridlock. Whether through Mayhew's laws or

bills the president publicly supports, higher levels of polarization decreases support for bill making them harder to pass. Second, regional coalitions have had an influence on the level of gridlock in the House. The cross-regional switching during the 1960s and 70s shows the dramatic change in coalitional politics and its influence on today's politics. This regional distinction has a far smaller effect than it did 20 years ago. Third, a measure of institutional features shows ideological polarization is more important today as a structural wall regardless if government is unified or divided.

As his study has argued, the findings presented no way detract from the divided government literature and the findings of these studies. Instead, this study hopefully adds an unexplored element to the debate that will further advance the profession's understanding of inter-governmental relations. The thrust of this study was to bridge some of the holes on the subject by adding an explanation that augments rather than detracts past work.

One objection this study raises, though, is the confusion in the semantic field over the definition of party, ideology, and polarization. All of these terms are used interchangeably, sparking confusion and inconsistency. Concepts which portray, with a certain degree of accuracy, the realities of the political world prove beneficial to better our theories and measures. A case in point is my use of party and polarization. One counter to this study that could be easily advanced is there is no difference between party, ideology, and polarization. In other words, my findings actually describe the workings of party argued by party theorists and divided government scholars. Here I disagree. The tenets of the party literature center on formations of likeminded members that make collective decisions through party leadership. Though I try not to make a straw-man

argument against this definition of party and its use in the divided government literature, I do acknowledge that the literature does address factional members within party. But I find a difference between party defined classically and that defined rationally. As modern party theorists argue, one group essentially fights the other for control of government, after which they reward those who elected them. This definition of party is ideological-based and factional in a polarization sense. Yet this definition is different that what traditional party explanations argue. The only reason a modern definition of party comports with my definition of polarization and faction is we are both looking at the same thing yet using different terminology. Further, a modern view of party seems party-centric because larger amounts of ideologically similar members are making collective decisions. This is much different than how parties operated 50 years ago. Definitions of party, then, need some form of reconceptualization.

Appendix A: *Measurement of Independent Variables*

I operationalize continuous independent variables as follows.

1. Ideological distance between members and president: $x_i = ID_{Mem} - ID_{\Pr ez}$

2. Member polarization score is calculated in two ways. First, I calculate the ideological polarization measure for the entire chamber: $X_i = \left| Dem_{MedID} - \Re p_{MedID} \right|$. I then take the chamber polarization score and divide by 2. This score is the absolute moderate point in the chamber. I then calculate the individual polarization score as: $x_i = \left| ID_{Mem} - Median_{Pol} \right|$.

Appendix B: *Tables of OLS Regression Results*

Table 1: Gridlock and Polarization - Base Model

Congress	Constant	Mem Pol	Prez ID	Prez Party	N	Adj R2
Mayhew's Laws						
80	0.0691**	**.6629*** **	0.0155	0.0722***	443	0.4861
81	-0.0442^	**0.4605*** **	**0.2786*** **	0.0985***	438	0.3839[a]
82	0.0987*	**0.6585*** **	**0.3771*** **	-0.1321***	441	0.4397
83	0.1346***	0.2322***	**-0.2255*** **	**-0.1342*** **	435	0.5207[a]
84	0.3130***	0.1853**	**0.4419*** **	-0.1021***	437	0.2745[a]
85	0.6256***	0.0648	**0.8290*** **	**-0.3816*** **	441	0.4900[a]
86	0.4774***	0.1443^	**0.5797*** **	**-0.4026*** **	437	0.3219[a]
87	-0.3301***	0.2999***	**0.8867*** **	0.1198***	444	0.7766[a]
88	-0.3421***	0.2806**	**0.9699*** **	0.1361***	440	0.7877[a]
89	-0.1351*	0.0588	**0.9759*** **	0.2491***	441	0.7592[a]
90	-0.1526**	0.0956	**0.5797*** **	**0.2630*** **	436	0.4672[a]
91	0.1615***	0.2295***	**0.1961*** **	-0.0645***	442	0.3396[a]
92	0.4908***	0.3236***	**0.5314*** **	**-0.3184*** **	438	0.4701[a]
93	0.3204***	0.2656***	**0.4145*** **	-0.1538***	440	0.5882[a]
94	0.5922***	0.1912***	**0.7633*** **	-0.1926***	438	0.6706[a]
95	-0.0336	0.3315***	**0.4232*** **	0.0077	437	0.5427[a]
96	-0.0731*	0.2810***	**0.4483*** **	0.0984***	439	0.4539[a]
97	0.4101***	0.3479***	0.2090***	**-0.2360*** **	437	0.2435
98	0.3130***	0.5518***	**0.4243*** **	-0.0628^	437	0.3788
99	0.2221***	0.4175***	**0.2401*** **	-0.0758**	437	0.2963
100	0.3701***	0.4839***	**0.5758*** **	-0.0137	439	0.8615[a]
101	0.4809***	0.4388***	**0.5807*** **	-0.2004***	438	0.4254[a]
102	0.2959***	0.5268***	**0.3856*** **	-0.1702***	437	0.3092
103	-0.1411*	0.4511***	**0.8161*** **	0.0359	437	0.8137[a]
104	0.1227***	0.4074***	**-0.2675*** **	0.0738**	445	0.7721[a]
105	-0.0650^	**0.4842*** **	-0.0572^	**0.1365*** **	441	0.524
106	0.1201*	0.6420***	**-0.3567*** **	0.0732^	439	0.7386[a]
President Aye Position						
80	-0.1944***	**.3518*** **	0.4621***	**0.2790*** **	442	0.3177[a]
81	-0.0043	0.2602*	**0.8151*** **	0.0299	438	0.8122[a]
82	-0.2457***	0.6752***	**1.104*** **	0.1018**	442	0.7451[a]
83	0.5219***	0.2158***	**0.3566*** **	-0.4452***	435	0.6142[a]
84	0.3663***	0.1751***	**0.4519*** **	-0.1840***	437	0.5101
85	0.5664***	0.1962***	**0.6404*** **	**-0.3309*** **	441	0.6007
86	0.5941***	0.1946***	**0.6792*** **	**-0.3326*** **	438	0.4378
87	-0.2772***	0.1914***	**0.8511*** **	0.1156***	444	0.8522[a]
88	-0.1809***	0.1897**	**0.7881*** **	0.0442^	440	0.8716[a]
89	-0.0468	0.0981	**0.7543*** **	0.1274***	441	0.8190[a]
90	-0.0418	0.0865^	**0.5051*** **	0.1443***	436	0.6983[a]
91	0.3366***	0.2645***	**0.2884*** **	**-0.1963*** **	442	0.3577[a]
92	0.4261***	0.3107***	**0.3996*** **	**-0.2909*** **	438	0.4686[a]
93	0.3877***	0.2740***	**0.3930*** **	-0.1858***	441	0.4799[a]
94	0.5045***	0.2845***	**0.5066*** **	-0.2330***	438	0.4322[a]
95	-0.1328***	0.2286***	**0.7245*** **	0..1105***	437	0.8329[a]
96	-0.1145***	0.2622***	**0.6408*** **	0.0910***	439	0.849
97	0.0791***	**0.2756*** **	**-0.1367*** **	**-0.0847*** **	437	0.5532

98	0.3539***	0.2797***	**0.2206*** **	**-0.1386*** **	437	0.1697
99	0.0730**	0.1921***	**-0.2694*** **	-0.0004	437	0.5211
100	0.1959***	**0.1926*** **	**0.0921*** **	-0.0416**	439	0.1594
101	0.3240***	0.4182***	**0.3561*** **	-0.1376***	438	0.3991
102	0.3573***	0.3362***	**0.2601*** **	**-0.1931*** **	436	0.2818
103	-0.1137***	0.3813***	**0.6196*** **	0.0013	437	0.9295[a]
104	0.0602***	**0.2127*** **	0.0326	-0.0048	445	0.3315[a]
105	-0.1353***	**0.3365*** **	**0.1417*** **	0.0863**	442	0.4024[a]
106	-0.0791*	**0.3353*** **	**0.1568* **	0.0811**	439	0.3004

Table 1: Gridlock and Polarization, con't

Congress	Constant	Mem Pol	Prez ID	Prez Party	N	Adj R2
President Nay Position						
80	0.4628***	-0.2264*	**0.8221*** **	-0.2218***	420	0.6348[a]
81	0.6861***	-0.9682***	**0.9595*** **	0.0628^	364	0.6399[a]
82	0.8268***	-0.1353*	0.3511***	**-0.7448*** **	421	0.8565[a]
83	0.7285***	-0.2292**	**-0.4164*** **	0.1586***	419	0.0706[a]
84	0.8413***	-0.1636**	-0.2064***	**-0.4961*** **	437	0.7500[a]
85	0.7730***	-0.2093***	-0.0902**	**-0.2262*** **	441	0.6355
86	0.7362***	-0.2192***	-0.3266***	**-0.3881*** **	438	0.8739[a]
87	0.3062***	-0.4187***	**0.9113*** **	-0.2308***	444	0.8648[a]
88	*n/a*	*n/a*	*n/a*	*n/a*	*n/a*	*n/a*
89	0.8276***	-0.1287**	**0.3160*** **	-0.0392*	439	0.5679[a]
90	0.6149***	-0.1843***	**0.5127*** **	0.0227	434	0.5905
91	0.6521***	-0.1983**	**-0.4720*** **	-0.0734**	435	0.7563[a]
92	0.1324**	0.1191	**-0.8432*** **	0.1198**	438	0.6699[a]
93	0.5199***	-0.2121*	**-0.5857*** **	-0.0066	441	0.8308[a]
94	0.3760***	-0.2555***	**-0.8454*** **	-0.0257	438	0.8732[a]
95	0.3664***	0.0214	**0.1868*** **	0.0139	437	0.1732
96	0.8528***	**-0.1206*** **	-0.0282	**-0.0592*** **	439	0.0885
97	0.4845***	-0.4301***	**-0.7137*** **	0.0257	437	0.8642[a]
98	0.4745***	-0.3788***	**-0.6394*** **	-0.004	437	0.9261[a]
99	0.4051***	-0.4232***	**-0.7864*** **	0.0157	437	0.9318[a]
100	0.5076***	-0.4126***	**-0.6756*** **	0.0486***	439	0.9427[a]
101	0.4566***	-0.3289***	**-0.6925*** **	0.0119	440	0.9282[a]
102	0.4112***	-0.2206***	**-0.6545*** **	-0.0495***	436	0.9098[a]
103	0.6268**	**-0.4395*** **	**0.2628** **	-0.0872	434	0.3042
104	0.5914***	-0.4402***	**0.5725*** **	-0.2135***	445	0.9449[a]
105	0.5189***	-0.3356***	**0.5675*** **	-0.1718***	442	0.9382[a]
106	0.6625***	-0.4291***	**0.4441*** **	-0.2062***	439	0.9380[a]

Table 2: Gridlock and Polarization - Coalition Model

Congress	*Constant*	*Mem Pol*	*Prez ID*	*S Dem*	*Other Dem*	*Uni Dem*	*N Rep*	*Other Rep*	*N*	*Adj R2*
Mayhew's Laws										
80	0.0537^	**.6560*** **	0.0301	0.0725**	0.0244	0.0928***	-0.0098	0.0683*	443	0.5012[a]
81	-0.1242**	**.5684*** **	**.3294*** **	0.1693***	0.2869**	0.1381***	0.1187**	0.1862***	438	0.4687[a]
82	0.0499	**.7117*** **	**.4204*** **	-0.1043*	0.0862	-0.1041*	0.0218	0.0538	441	0.4376
83	-0.0302*	.2824***	-0.1910***	0.1881***	0.1287**	**0.1650*** **	0.0994***	0.1079**	435	0.5437[a]
84	0.1631***	.3142***	**0.4528*** **	0.1861***	0.1963**	0.1004**	0.2502***	-0.0456	437	0.3502[a]
85	0.1932***	.1844**	**0.7027*** **	0.4697***	0.3642***	**0.2921*** **	0.0882*	0.045	441	0.5201[a]
86	0.0148	.2734**	**0.4612*** **	**0.5429*** **	0.1083	**0.3234*** **	0.1184**	0.0904**	437	0.3982[a]
87	-0.1448*	**.4527*** **	0.6164***	0.1560***	0.0619^	-0.0830*	-0.0515^	-0.0279	444	0.8160[a]
88	-0.0327	**.2857*** **	0.6236***	0.1404***	-0.0304	-0.1312**	-0.1893***	-0.0724^	440	0.8405[a]
89	0.081	.1987*	**0.5570*** **	0.2717***	0.0831	-0.0699	-0.1257**	-0.1254**	441	0.8519[a]
90	-0.0184	.2534**	**0.2770*** **	**0.2846*** **	0.1559***	0.0264	-0.0732*	-0.0755**	436	0.5665[a]
91	0.0412**	**.3415*** **	0.1188**	0.1085***	0.0303	0.0076	0.0672***	0.0205	442	0.4045[a]
92	0.0577**	.5487***	0.3154**	**0.4053*** **	0.3010***	0.1510***	0.0715^	0.0208	438	0.5661[a]
93	0.1302**	.3400***	**0.3359*** **	0.1698***	0.1867***	0.0910*	0.0167	-0.0194	440	0.6084[a]
94	0.3778**	.2543***	**0.4134*** **	0.1332***	0.1205*	-0.0955**	-0.1874***	-0.0855*	438	0.7321[a]
95	0.0326	**.4804*** **	**0.2619*** **	0.0560*	0.0546^	-0.1164***	-0.0144	0.0637	437	0.594
96	-0.0916	.3219***	**0.3635*** **	0.0975**	0.1064**	0.0304	-0.0349	-0.0134	439	0.4617[a]
97	0.1766***	.3585***	**0.2747*** **	0.2189***	0.3548***	**0.2935*** **	0.0911*	0.0015	437	0.2573
98	0.1965***	**.6590*** **	**0.3478*** **	0.1191**	0.0968	-0.0018	0.0611	-0.0511	437	0.391
99	0.0993***	**.5177*** **	**0.1966*** **	0.0890**	0.1923***	0.0364	0.0401	0.0365	437	0.3353[a]
100	0.3244***	.5490***	**0.5325*** **	0.0391	0.0328	-0.0251	0.0083	0.0302	439	0.8661[a]
101	0.2094***	.5935***	**0.6012*** **	0.2677***	0.3178***	0.2182***	0.1396**	0.1031*	438	0.4316
102	0.1053***	.5710***	**0.4754*** **	0.1802***	0.2785***	**0.2511*** **	0.1242**	0.0212	437	0.3212
103	0.1670***	.3639***	**0.5412*** **	-0.0416	-0.1166*	-0.2343***	-0.2011***	-0.2497***	437	0.8437
104	0.0503*	.4415***	**-0.2175*** **	0.0937***	0.1133***	0.1313***	0.0788***	0.0675***	445	0.7856[a]
105	-0.1939***	**.5331*** **	0.0367	0.2024***	0.2269***	**0.2433*** **	0.0997***	0.1289***	441	0.5627[a]
106	0.0272	**.7821*** **	-0.3447***	0.1405**	0.2015***	0.0935*	0.1472***	0.0781*	439	0.7565[a]
President Aye Position										
80	-0.2057***	.3844***	**0.4521*** **	0.3262***	0.1727**	**0.2752*** **	0.1034**	0.0572^	442	0.3294[a]
81	0.123	.3241**	**0.5960*** **	0.0781^	0.086	-0.1432**	-0.1358*	-0.0983*	438	0.8620[a]
82	-0.1922***	.8351***	**0.8510*** **	0.1744***	0.1697**	-0.0306	-0.032	0.0611	442	0.7750[a]
83	0.0397**	.2833***	0.3419***	0.5189***	0.3201**	**0.4483*** **	0.0863**	0.1745***	435	0.6566[a]

84	0.1517***	.2460***	**0.4176*** **	0.2536***	0.1284***	0.1601***	0.0813***	0.0404*	437	0.5547
85	0.2030***	.2718***	**0.5295*** **	**0.3854*** **	0.3564***	**0.2520*** **	0.0374	0.0451	441	0.6257[a]
86	0.1915***	.3403***	**0.6247*** **	**0.4591*** **	0.2609***	**0.3034*** **	0.1256**	0.2087***	438	0.5041
87	-0.1018*	.3092***	**0.6090*** **	0.1391***	0.0485	-0.0683*	-0.0605**	-0.0507^	444	0.8902[a]
88	0.0579	.2325***	**0.5019*** **	0.0607*	0.0004	-0.1747***	-0.1252***	-0.0501^	440	0.9192[a]
89	0.1347*	.1994**	**0.4133*** **	0.1311***	0.0454	-0.1330**	-0.1362***	-0.0505	441	0.9044[a]
90	0.0664*	.2191***	**0.2580*** **	0.1587***	0.1003**	-0.0491*	-0.0579**	-0.0604**	437	0.7963[a]
91	0.0322^	**.4822*** **	0.0718^	**0.2509*** **	0.1909***	0.0269	0.0488*	0.0099	442	0.4911[a]
92	0.0440**	.4886***	0.2609***	**0.3584*** **	0.3392***	0.1867***	0.0787*	0.0531^	438	0.5427[a]
93	0.1468***	**.3865*** **	**0.2631*** **	**0.2074*** **	0.2301***	0.0813*	0.0105	-0.0318	441	0.5282[a]
94	0.2694***	.2969***	**0.3610*** **	0.1713***	0.2623***	0.1061**	-0.0857***	-0.012	438	0.4306[a]
95	-0.0278	.3120***	**0.5539*** **	0.1282***	0.0891**	-0.0252	-0.0582**	-0.0623**	437	0.8649[a]
96	-0.0414	.3579***	**0.5034*** **	0.1073***	0.1414***	-0.0183	-0.0191	-0.0357^	439	0.8810[a]
97	-0.002	.2907***	-0.0301	0.0871***	0.1994***	**0.1776*** **	0.1154***	0.0539**	437	0.6092[a]
98	.2027***	**.3032*** **	**0.1846*** **	0.1215***	0.2074***	**0.1072** **	-0.0068	-0.0092	437	0.1711
99	.0719***	.2173***	**-0.1585*** **	-0.0137	0.1361***	**0.0945*** **	0.0870**	0.0909**	437	0.5664
100	.1417***	**.2237*** **	**0.1082*** **	0.0481*	0.0844**	**0.0555* **	0.0319^	0.0245	439	0.1748[a]
101	.1511***	**.4942*** **	**0.3606*** **	0.1469***	0.2386***	0.1414***	0.0667*	0.0589^	440	0.4105
102	.1301***	.4103***	**0.2793*** **	0.2234***	0.2684***	**0.2092*** **	0.0757**	0.0299	436	0.2935
103	-0.0078	.3819***	**0.5099*** **	-0.0096	-0.0298	-0.1078***	-0.0668**	-0.0659*	437	0.9399[a]
104	0.0615**	**.2653*** **	0.0038	0.0334*	0.0022	-0.0350*	-0.0024	0.0141	445	0.3535
105	-0.1795***	**.4566*** **	0.1175***	0.1507***	0.1609***	0.0675*	0.0693***	0.0779*	442	0.4768[a]
106	-0.0304	**.4241*** **	0.0637	0.0790^	0.1276**	-0.0185	-0.0055	-0.0161	439	0.3552[a]

Table 2: Gridlock and Polarization - Coalition Model, con't

Congress	Constant	Mem Pol	Prez ID	S Dem	Other Dem	Uni Dem	N Rep	Other Rep	N	Adj R2
President Nay Position										
80	0.5606***	-0.1006	**0.6250*** **	-0.0084	-0.2921^	**-0.3866*** **	-0.3446***	-0.0071	420	0.6789[a]
81	0.6972***	-1.010***	**0.9664*** **	0.0292**	0.1193*	0.0688	-0.0548	-0.0059	364	0.6410[a]
82	0.7976***	0.0809	0.2754***	-0.6209***	-0.5699***	**-0.8131*** **	0.078**	0.0777**	421	0.8642[a]
83	0.9078***	-0.2505*	**-0.5124*** **	-0.1461*	-0.2750*	**-0.2406*** **	-0.1109	-0.1406*	419	0.0987[a]
84	0.3184***	-0.1447**	-0.1586**	0.5446***	0.1059	**0.5623*** **	0.0049	0.2283***	437	0.7950[a]
85	0.5576***	-0.2410**	-0.1137**	0.1940***	0.1697*	**0.2118*** **	-0.034	0.0163	441	0.6251

86	0.3178***	-0.1739***	-0.1733***	**0.3933*** **	0.2020^	**0.5139*** **	0.1294***	0.2384***	438	0.8941[a]
87	0.5148***	-0.2459***	**-0.6082*** **	-0.1674***	-0.3993***	**-0.4587*** **	-0.0779*	-0.0289	444	0.8897
88										
89	0.9228***	-0.1046**	0.1587***	-0.0551**	-0.0479	**-0.1619*** **	-0.0917**	-0.0337	439	0.5986[a]
90	0.7108***	-0.1832**	**0.3679*** **	-0.0063	-0.014	-0.0923*	-0.1470***	-0.0217	434	0.6088
91	0.6068***	-0.2545***	0.3293***	0.0714*	0.1429**	**0.1940*** **	0.0868*	0.061	435	0.7769[a]
92	0.3343***	-0.045	**-0.5661*** **	-0.1478***	0.1291^	0.1089*	0.0623	0.0843^	438	0.7072[a]
93	0.5402***	-0.2650**	**-0.3991*** **	0.0319	0.0197	0.1650**	0.1354**	0.0900*	441	0.8610[a]
94	0.3739***	-0.3197***	**-0.5441*** **	0.0347	0.0910*	**0.2665*** **	0.2069***	0.1002*	438	0.9198[a]
95	0.3713***	-0.0012	**0.1936*** **	0.021	-0.0550^	0.0182	0.0069	-0.0414	437	0.1814
96	0.8963***	-0.1574***	-0.0597*	-0.0773***	-0.0876***	**-0.0880*** **	-0.0739**	-0.0642*	437	0.099
97	0.5438***	-0.4808***	**-0.5862*** **	-0.0154	-0.0597	0.0842**	0.0392	0.0979*	437	0.8767[a]
98	0.4859***	-0.3972***	**-0.5509*** **	0.005	0.004	0.0801**	0.0669**	0.0401	437	0.9334[a]
99	0.4338***	-0.4288***	**-0.6716*** **	0.0207	-0.0347	0.0837**	0.1058***	0.0004	437	0.9409[a]
100	0.5904***	-0.4797***	**-0.6126*** **	-0.0709***	-0.0560**	0.0077	-0.0007	-0.0138	439	0.9482[a]
101	0.4845***	-0.3631***	**-0.5574*** **	-0.0059	0.0215	0.1108***	0.0846***	0.0089	440	0.9418[a]
102	0.3657***	-0.2316***	**-0.4869*** **	0.0817*	0.1075**	0.2038***	0.1110***	0.0501	436	0.9234[a]
103	0.6814***	**-0.4567*** **	**0.2119***	-0.0176	-0.2205*	-0.1319	-0.0091	0.0774	434	0.3168
104	0.6876***	-0.3812***	**0.4543*** **	-0.1701***	-0.2435***	**-0.3488*** **	-0.0995***	-0.1005***	445	0.9556[a]
105	0.7792***	-0.3328***	**0.3207*** **	-0.2382***	-0.3372***	**-0.4414*** **	-0.1740***	-0.1945***	442	0.9639[a]
106	0.7475***	-0.3786***	**0.3413** **	-0.1749***	-0.2125***	**-0.3252*** **	-0.0635*	-0.0918**	439	0.9481[a]

Table 3: Gridlock and Polarization - Institutional Model

Congress	*Constant*	*Mem Pol*	*Prez ID*	*Maj Coal*	*Super Maj*	*N*	*Adj R2*
Mayhew's Laws							
80	0.1053***	**.7457*** **	0.0288	-0.0744**	0.0399	443	0.5035[a]
81	-0.0723**	**.5410*** **	**.2735*** **	0.0962***	0.0709***	438	0.407
82	0.0057	**.7224*** **	**.4763*** **	-0.0591	0.0134	441	0.4242
83	0.0272	.1725**	**-0.4113*** **	-0.001	0.0171	435	0.4788[a]
84	0.1509***	.3221***	**0.5475*** **	0.1821***	0.1242**	437	0.2791[a]
85	0.2358***	0.1113	**0.6831*** **	**0.2669*** **	0.1359**	441	0.2751[a]
86	0.0959**	0.1637	**0.2494* **	**0.1303* **	**0.2410*** **	437	0.0986[a]
87	-0.1111^	0.3178***	**0.6413*** **	-0.0679^	0.0268	444	0.7657[a]
88	0.0922	0.1758**	**0.5306*** **	-0.2015***	-0.0594	440	0.7878[a]
89	0.2485***	0.0735	**0.3991*** **	**-0.2069*** **	-0.0065	441	0.7160[a]
90	0.0201	0.0838	**0.3340*** **	0.0646	0.064	436	0.2430[a]
91	0.0729***	**0.2764*** **	**0.1698** **	0.0479	0.0656**	442	0.3301[a]
92	0.1451***	0.3861***	**0.3437*** **	0.1575**	0.1512***	438	0.2188[a]
93	0.1521***	0.2889***	**0.3264*** **	0.0832*	0.0577	440	0.4865[a]
94	0.3592***	0.3164***	**0.5318*** **	0.0013	0.1347***	438	0.6409[a]
95	0.1121**	**0.4163*** **	**0.2003*** **	**-0.1646*** **	-0.0325	437	0.5742
96	-0.0128	0.3151***	**0.3661*** **	0.0279	0.0513	439	0.4319[a]
97	0.1489***	0.4120***	0.2181***	**0.2437*** **	0.1272***	437	0.1637
98	0.1901***	**0.6566*** **	**0.2697*** **	-0.0654	0.058	437	0.3943[a]
99	0.1031***	**0.4902*** **	0.1539***	0.0079	0.0703*	437	0.2973
100	0.3255***	**0.5335*** **	0.4738***	-0.0724*	0.0075	439	0.8682[a]
101	0.2104***	0.5925***	**0.6080*** **	0.2277***	0.2407***	438	0.4225
102	0.0982***	0.5808***	**0.3675*** **	0.1586**	0.1546***	437	0.2923
103	0.1541^	0.3895***	**0.5285*** **	-0.2254***	-0.1103*	437	0.8223[a]
104	0.1994***	0.4044***	**-0.3453*** **	-0.0053	0.0117	445	0.7673[a]
105	0.0685***	**0.4781*** **	**-0.1996*** **	0.0153	0.0002	441	0.5022
106	0.2184***	0.6387***	**-0.4319*** **	-0.0373**	-0.0237	439	0.7406[a]
President Aye Position							
80	0.0183	.4931***	**0.4200*** **	**-0.2314*** **	0.0287	442	0.2404
81	-0.0357	.3443*	**0.8097*** **	0.0275	0.0741*	438	0.8192[a]
82	-0.1954**	.7029***	**0.9157*** **	0.035	0.0749^	442	0.7398[a]
83	0.1687***	0.015	**-0.2606*** **	-0.0035	0.0416	435	0.1667[a]
84	0.1663***	0.2182***	**0.3851*** **	0.1344***	0.0890***	437	0.3418[a]
85	0.2464***	0.1974***	**0.4574*** **	0.1886***	0.0880**	441	0.2203
86	0.2795***	0.2118**	**0.3747*** **	0.0834^	0.1929***	438	0.2563[a]
87	-0.1018*	0.2262**	**0.6455*** **	-0.0409	0.0484^	444	0.8405[a]
88	0.0419	0.1636**	**0.5470*** **	-0.1373***	-0.0191	440	0.8839[a]
89	0.2198***	0.1196*	**0.3400*** **	**-0.1955*** **	-0.0397	441	0.8242[a]
90	0.0857**	0.0828*	**0.3128*** **	-0.0049	0.0425*	437	0.6018[a]
91	0.1109***	**0.3197*** **	**0.1545*** **	**0.0893** **	**0.1001*** **	442	0.1685[a]
92	0.1170***	0.3597***	**0.2857*** **	**0.1898*** **	0.1440***	438	0.1863
93	0.1792***	0.3148***	**0.3100*** **	0.1210***	0.0870***	441	0.3401[a]
94	0.2340***	0.4151***	**0.3744*** **	0.1148***	0.2154***	438	0.3519
95	0.1018	0.2711***	**0.5335*** **	-0.0446^	0.307	437	0.8165[a]
96	-0.0204	0.3369***	**0.4967*** **	-0.0276	0.0502*	439	0.8417[a]
97	-0.0319**	**0.3507*** **	-0.0616^	**0.1504*** **	0.1038***	437	0.5670[a]
98	0.1871***	**0.3184*** **	0.0965*	0.0358	0.0739**	437	0.112
99	0.0556**	**0.2393*** **	-0.2304***	0.0337	0.0427^	437	0.5235

100	0.1416***	**0.2178*** **	**0.0806** **	0.033	0.381*	439	0.151
101	0.1371***	0.5276***	**0.3900*** **	0.1692***	0.1371***	440	0.4054
102	0.1281***	**0.4075*** **	**0.2081*** **	**0.1520*** **	**0.1702*** **	436	0.2214
103	-0.0018	**0.4016*** **	0.4892***	-0.1192***	-0.0281	437	0.9369[a]
104	0.0479***	**0.2131*** **	0.0395***	0.0061	0.0202*	445	0.3409[a]
105	-0.0416*	**0.3362*** **	0.0505***	-0.0046	-0.0195*	442	0.3817[a]
106	0.0195	**0.3282*** **	0.0734***	-0.0258*	-0.0022	439	0.296

Table 3: Gridlock and Polarization - Institutional Model, con't

Congress President Nay Position	*Constant*	*Mem Pol*	*Prez ID*	*Maj Coal*	*Super Maj*	*N*	*Adj R2*
80	.1944***	-0.1322	0.5450***	**0.4305*** **	0.2996***	420	0.6636[a]
81	.7104***	-1.030***	**0.9581*** **	0.0632^	-0.0476	364	0.6410[a]
82	.8434***	-0.0877	0.2828**	**-0.7776*** **	-0.1342**	421	0.7978
83	.8650***	-0.1683^	**-0.1978*** **	0.0084	-0.0868^	419	0.0622[a]
84	.3702***	-0.1909*	**-0.4872*** **	**0.2803*** **	0.1156*	437	0.6013[a]
85	.5811***	-0.2641***	**-0.2447*** **	0.1030**	0.0059	441	0.5039
86	.3932***	-0.2914***	-0.2920***	**0.3969*** **	0.2479***	438	0.8010[a]
87	.5185***	-0.3529***	**0.6368*** **	**-0.4234*** **	-0.1569***	444	0.8786[a]
88							
89	.8607***	-0.0882*	**0.2344*** **	**-0.0979** **	-0.0376	439	0.5759[a]
90	.7229***	-0.2033***	**0.3508*** **	-0.0965**	-0.017	434	0.6009
91	.5607***	-0.1402*	**-0.3103*** **	**0.2058*** **	0.1047**	435	0.7809[a]
92	.2757***	0.0795	**-0.6604*** **	0.0299	-0.0458	438	0.6586[a]
93	.5011***	-0.1676*	**-0.3799*** **	**0.1777** **	0.0916*	441	0.8555[a]
94	.3832***	-0.3198***	**-0.5662*** **	**0.2381*** **	0.1030**	438	0.8938[a]
95	.3387***	-0.0475	**0.2565*** **	0.0674*	-0.0073	437	0.1902
96	.9220***	-0.1861***	-0.0847*	**-0.1009*** **	**-0.1042*** **	437	0.1121
97	.4999***	-0.3745***	**-0.5594*** **	0.1053***	0.0694**	437	0.8687[a]
98	.4854***	-0.3904***	**-0.5344*** **	0.0918***	0.0363*	437	0.9310[a]
99	.4237***	-0.3965***	**-0.6442*** **	0.1028**	0.0470*	437	0.9351[a]
100	.5847***	-0.4553***	**-0.5752*** **	0.0349^	-0.0247	439	0.9441[a]
101	.4765***	-0.3359***	**-0.5270*** **	0.1297***	0.0428*	440	0.9362[a]
102	.3606***	-0.2132***	**-0.4808*** **	0.2035***	0.1058***	436	0.9221[a]
103	.5846***	-0.4526***	**0.3187** **	-0.041	-0.0455	434	0.3001
104	.3752***	-0.4313***	**0.7991*** **	-0.0088	-0.0028	445	0.9325[a]
105	.3369***	-0.347***	**0.7484*** **	0.0091	0.0124	442	0.9303
106	.4511***	-0.4225***	**0.6557*** **	0.0006	-0.0063	439	0.9250[a]

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